Causation and the Significance of the Natural/Philosophical Relation distinction in Treatise 1.3.6
The main aim of this paper is to explore why it is so important for Hume to define ?cause' as he does. I take up this question in order to shed light on the significance of the natural/philosophical relation (hereafter NPR) distinction, especially as it is used in Treatise 1.3.6. I argue that the NPR distinction allows Hume to dismiss conceptions of causation at odds with his own; it provides an instance of the normative nature of Hume's "science of man."
Treatise 1.3.6 is much studied in the context of debates over Hume's skepticism, his understanding of "reason," and what has become known as the problem of induction. In this paper, I largely side-step these debates, although I show that even if one thinks that there is no trace of Hume's skepticism in 1.3.6, the section has more bite than is recognized by those advocating the apparent, current scholarly consensus on the nature of Hume's naturalism. For a consequence of my analysis is that the NPR distinction -- in conjunction with an important corollary to the so-called copy principle -- is meant to undercut appeals to the authority of theories not founded on the "principles" of Hume's "science of human nature."
In order to illustrate my claims about Hume's account of causation, I contrast it with Newton's natural philosophy. Doing this has the nice consequence that it reinforces an argument that I have made elsewhere: that Hume's philosophy is, despite oft-repeated claims to the contrary, deeply at odds with Newton's and, of course, many other philosophers and natural philosophers. In this paper, I do not adjudicate between Hume and Newton.
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